Risk, self-protection, and ex ante economic value by Shogren, Jason F. & Crocker, Thomas D.
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
5-1990





Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shogren, Jason F. and Crocker, Thomas D., "Risk, self-protection, and ex ante economic value" (1990). CARD Working Papers. 97.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/97
Risk, self-protection, and ex ante economic value
Abstract
We develop three propositions about the ex ante value of reduced risk. If there is a continuous outcome
distribution and if self-protection influences outcome probability and severity, then: (1) unobservable utility
terms cannot be eliminated from the ex ante value expressions; (2) knowledge of the convexity or the
nonconvexity of dose-response functions is insufficient to sign changes in these expressions; and (3) self-
protection expenditures need not be a lower bound measure of these expressions. Therefore, many restrictions
applied in recent empirical work on the economic value of risk changes are not immediately transferable to
settings where endogenous risks prevail.
Disciplines
Behavioral Economics
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/97
Risk, Self-Protection, 
and Ex Ante Economic Value 
Jason F. Shogren and Thomas D. Crocker 
Working Paper 90-WP 57 
May 1990 
ABSTRACT 
We develop three propositions about the ex ante value of reduced risk. 
If there is a continuous outcome distribution and if self-protection 
influences outcome probability and severity, then: (1) unobservable utility 
terms cannot be eliminated from the ex ante value expressions; (2) Knowledge 
of the convexity or the nonconvexity of dose-response functions is 
insufficient to sign changes in these expressions; and {3) self-protection 
expenditures need not be a lower bound· measure of these expressions. 
Therefore, many restrictions applied in recent empirical work on the economic 
value of risk changes are not immediately transferable to settings where 
endogenous risks prevail. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Publ~c agencies now feel considerable pressure to reduce risks tc 
individuals' health and welfare through additional provision of security, 
personal safety, fire and flood prevention, auto safety, product safety, 
environmental protection, and emergency planning. Persons who might suffer 
harm from exposu~e to hazards can reduce their expected ex post costs by 
purchasing market insurance. However, Arrow [1] and Shavell [31] show that 
moral hazard compels private insurers to defray only a fraction of ~hese 
costs. Moreover, adverse selection and nonindependence of risks cause 
contingent claims markets to be incomplete. Finally, many individuals are 
thought to be '' ... psychologically unable to cope with risk'' (Oi [25]), causing 
them to misperceive it systematically. Collective attempts to overcome these 
limits to decentralized allocations and resolutions of risk can be more 
efficient if accurate estimates are available of individuals' choices and the 
ex ante economic values of risk reductions that these choices imply. 
The empirical risk valuation literature typically assumes that: (i) 
risks are independent of individual actions; and (ii) individuals require 
progressively increasing compensation if they are to maintain constant 
expected utility when confronted by increasing risk. Jones-Lee et al. [16], 
for example, embodies both conditions. These conditions could be excessively 
restrictive in the sense that they excise common and plausibly significant 
features of the individual's decision problem. We investigate the structure 
of functions representing this individual's willingness to pay to reduce risk 
when these two restrictions are set aside. 
Two bits of theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the t~o 
restrictions lead to misleading results. First, Marshall [22) shows t~at 
exogenous ~isk requires a complete set of Arrow-Debreu contingent clai~s 
contracts. 3ecause the writing of contracts is costly, complete ccntrac~s 
rarely, if ever, exist: the individual must therefore choose between 
contractually defining states of nature or making an effort to alter states of 
nature. Spence and Zeckhauser [36] demonstrate that the ability to influence 
states of nature enhances both the ex ante and the ex post gains frcm 
adaptation. Ehrlich and Becker [10], Laffont [19], and Crocker [5] allow 
individual prior actions to influence ex post gains. Shogren and crocker [33] 
show in a set of controlled experiments that these prior actions influence the 
individual's ex ante willingness to pay for collective risk reduction efforts. 
Second, in a contingent valuation study of the risk valuations attached 
to hazardous waste exposures, Smith and Desvousges [34, 35] report increas~~g 
marginal valuations with decreasing exogenous risk. This finding is but the 
latest in a 15-year-long parade of analytical (Starett [40], Winrich [45]) and 
empirical (Crocker [6], Repetto (28]) papers which use prior inforrnatio~ on 
physical dose-response relations, individual abilities to process in:ormation 
about these relations, or individual perceptions of the relations to produce 
an increasing marginal valuation result for more of a desirable commodity. 
However, when risk is endogenous, no one has yet asked whether convexity of 
the marginal value of risk follows when cognition is not an issue. 
Berger et al. [2] appear to be among the first to consider endogenous 
risks in the context of human health. Our treatment differs from their 
seminal effort in two significant ways. First, though they state the general 
continuous distribution case of risks to human health, they examine ex ante 
value only in a world of two mutually exclusive and independent states of 
nature: survival or death. We extend the ex ante value concept to the 
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general co~~inuous case, while presuming that individuals recognize ~hat 
outcomes are stochastically related to actions, implying that predictions of 
behavior and the relative values that motivate it depend not only on 
preference orderings over outcomes, but also on preference orderings of 
lotteries over outcomes.V 
Second, Berger et al. [2] model only probability-in!luencing self-
protection. They disregard the severity of the health outcome being risked, 
even though they concede that prior self-protection can influence both ex ante 
probability and ex post severity. Similarly, Lewis and Nickerson [21] work 
with self-insurance that influences ex post severity, but they do not allow 
the individual to affect ex ante probabilities. Ehrlich and Becker [10] po~nt 
out that the distinction between self-protection that influences probability 
and self-protection that influences severity is somewhat artificial. The 
distinction is often made for theoretical convenience (see, for example, 
Hiebert [13]). In contrast, we model the effects of self-protection that 
influences both the probability and the severity of the undesired state, and 
we consider the effects on the ex ante value of reduced risk. This allows us 
to develop three propositions: 
1) Given moral hazard, when self-protection influences the 
probability, the severity, or both of an undesirable state, unobservable 
utility terms cannot be eliminated from the individual's ex ante 
valuation expression. Consequently, empirical studies that at~ribute 
differences across groups in ex ante value estimates solely to 
unobserved differences in household health production technologies are 
misplaced. 
5 
2) With moral hazard and self-protection, knowledge o~ the 
convexity or nonconvexity of physical dose-response relations is 
insufficient to sign unambiguously the change in an individual's 
ex ante marginal valuation for a reduction in the level of the 
hazard, even when consumer cognition is perfect. Therefore, we do 
not support the traditional argument that those individuals 
exposed to greater risk with greater income must place a higher 
value on a given risk reduction. 
3} With moral hazard, an increase in the level of the 
environmental hazard does not necessarily lead to an increase in 
the level of self-protection. Therefore, self-protection 
expenditures are not a consistent lower bound of the ex ante value 
a risk averse individual attaches to a reduction in risk. 
These three statements imply that several propositions originally 
developed for cases of exogenous risk and which form the analytical basis for 
most recent empirical work on the value of health risk changes are no~ 
immediately transferable to settings where endogenous risks prevail. 
2. SELF-PROTECTION AND RISK 
Psychologists agree that individuals perceive that they have substantial 
control over uncertain events (Perlmuter and ~onty (26]). Stallen and Tomas 
[39] conclude ~hat " ... the individual is not so much concerned with estimating 
uncertain parameters of a physical or material system as he is with estima~~ng 
the uncertainty involved in his exposure to the threatening event and in 
opportunities to influence or control his exposure" (emphasis added). Starr 
(39], an engineer, makes much of the difference between voluntary (endogenous) 
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and involuntary (exogenous) exposures to risk. Indeed, rare is the 
.noneconomL= discussion of risk that does not consider·· ... measures ~hat modify 
events or reduce ~he vulnerability to loss'' (Kates [18, p. 7]. People move or 
reduce physical activities when air pollution becomes intolerable, they buy 
bottled water if they suspect that alternative supplies are polluted, they 
chelate children who have high blood lead concentrations, and they apply 
sunscreen to protect their skins from UV radiation. Finally, if one sets 
aside its risk valuation component, endogenous risk considerations are 
abundant in technical economic discourse.~ 
At the policy level, the success of collective safety mandates often 
depends upon individual choices. Auto seat belts, when worn, reduce both the 
probability and the severity of injury, but ~heir mandatory installation 
cannot guarantee that passengers will choose to wear them. Workplace safety 
initiatives involving personal protective gear (e.g., hard hats) have t~e same 
problem. Highway speed limits are yet another example. In each case, 
individual decisions influence both the chance and the magnitude of harm.~ 
Individuals often substitute self-protection that is expected to reduce 
hazard probability or severity or both for collectively supplied safety 
programs. Burton et al. [3] enumerate numerous examples including the use of 
higher-strength building materials in response to prospective tornado, storm 
surge, and earthquake hazards, more thorough ~eeding and crop storage in 
response ~o the prospect of drought, sandbagging and evacuation in 
anticipation of floods, and improved nutrition and exercise regimens to cope 
with health threats. These and similar private coping strategies reduce the 
individual's chance of having a threat realized and its magnitude if it is 
realized. 
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Finally, recognition of the frequently endogenous nature of risk raises 
questions about the assessment-management bifurcation now common in scientific 
and policy discussions about environmental risks to human health and proper~y. 
Broadly, risk assessment, because it defines what risk levels are, is 
considered to be the exclusive domain of the natural and the biomedical 
sciences, while risk management is left to the law, politics, philosophy, 
economics, and the sciences (National Academy of Sciences [24]). However, 
endogenous risk implies that observed risks are functions of natural science 
parameters and the self-protection decisions of individuals. Alternatively 
stated, the risks on the basis of which people make decisions will differ 
across individuals with the relative marginal productivities of their self-
protec~ion efforts, even though the properties of the natural phenomena that 
trigger these efforts may apply equally to everyone. It follows that attempts 
to assess observed risk levels solely in natural science terms may be highly 
misleading: costly self-protection is endogenous and may thus vary 
systematically in the observed risk data. Economic parameters enter a~d the 
manner in which they do so depends upon the relative values that people assign 
them. Some properties of these values for the case of endogenous risk are 
established in the next section. 
3. THE MODEL 
Consider an individual who is involuntarily exposed to a heal~~ ~isk 
under a particular liability regime. Assume the risk is created by exposure 
to an ambient concentration of given duration of an environmental hazard, r, 
taken from the real interval, R: 
R (_::, r I. I 1 I 
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Because cf moral hazard, the individual cannot acquire enough marke~ insurance 
to avo~d ~~e risk completely. If he were able to do so, the risk would be 
exogenous (Marshall [22]). The individual must decide from a real i~terval, 
S, how much self-protection, s, to undertake: 
s I~, s I . ( 2 I 
Given exposure to the hazard, the individual is uncertain as to where in 
a continuum of health outcomes, h, he will be. Let h(s, r) denote the outcome 
space, where outcomes are the individual's human health capital returns 
ordered from smallest to largest, given the individual's genetic and 
development history. 
Let f(h; s, r) denote the probability of a particular outcome occurring 
given that self-protection, s, is undertaken and that the exposure level t~ 
the environmental hazard is r. Assume the following about f(·): 
Assumption 1: f(h; s, r) > 0 for every s E S and r E R. 
Let F(h; s, r) denote the corresponding distribution function defined 
over the support [a, b] 
= lb F(h; s, r) f(h; s, rldh ( 3 I 
"' 
where a and b are the minimum and maximum health outcomes.~ We assume the 
following about F(•): 
Assumption 2: F(h; s, r) is twice continuously differentiable ln s E S and 
r E R for every health outcome. 
Assumption 3: ~(h; s, r) ~ 0 for every s E SandrE Rand every health 
outcome in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, where a 
subscript denotes a partial derivative.~ 
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Assumption 4: ~(h; s, r) ~ 0 for every s e S and r e Rand every hea:~h 
outsome in ~he sense of first-order stochastic dominance. 
Assumption 5: No restrictions are placed on the convexity of the 
distribution function in the immediate neighborhood of an optimal level 
of self-protection, s*, for all s e S and r e Rand for every health 
outcome. 
The individual is risk averse with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
index over wealth W, U(W). The following assumptions are made about U(W): 
- -Assumption 6: U is defined over the real interval [W, ooj where W is 0. 
Assumption 7: Lim U(W) -ro. 
w~w 
Assumption 8: U is strictly increasing, concave, and thrice continuously 
differentiable. 
For each health outcome the individual might realize, he selects a 
minimum cost combination of medical care and foregone work and consumption. 
Let c = C{h; s, r) 
be his ex ante expectation of realized costs ~hich depend on the uncertain 
( 4 I 
health outcome, self-protection, and the exposure level to the hazard. Assume 
the following about C(·): 
Assumption 9: C is strictly decreasing, convex, and thrice continuously 
differentiable in s e S for every health outcome such that S < 0, Ss > 
0, and csh ~ 0 for all h. 
Assumption 10: C is strictly increasing and thrice continuously 
differentiable in r e R for every health outcome such that S > 0, and 
No restrictions, however, are placed on err for all h. 
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Given incomplete insurance purchases, intertemporally separable utility, 
and constan~ expected prices for medical care, the individual's choice problem 
is then 
Max [r U(W- C(h; s, r) - s)dF(h; s, r)]. 
seS a 
Note that the price of self-protection has been normalized to unity. 
Is l 
Given the model, we are now able to develop the propositions s~ated in 
the introduction. 
4. EX ANTE VALUE AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
4.1 Endogenous Risk. A few very recent refinements to the willingness 
to pay approach to valuing environmental hazards have acknowledged the 
frequently endogenous form of the problem. For example, Rosen [30], Berger et 
al. [2], and Viscusi et al. [4] note that self-protection affects survival or 
injury probabilities, while Shibata and Winrich (32] and Gerking and Stanley 
(11] allow self-protection to influence the severity of ex post damages. In a 
nonstochastic world or -in an uncertain world with only two feasible states, 
these studies demonstrate that marginal willingness to pay can be expressed 
solely in terms of the marginal rate of technical substitution between hazard 
concentrations and self-protection. This result cannot be generalized ~o a 
continuous world with endogenous risk. 
Proposition 1: Given the model assumptions, when self-protection 
influences either the probability or the severity of health 
outcomes or both, the individual's marginal willingness to pay for 
reduced risk cannot be expressed solely in terms of the marginal 
rate of tech~ical substitution between ambient hazard 
11 
concentrations and self-protection. In particular, unobservable 
utility terms cannot be eliminated from expressions for the ex 
ante value of reduced risk. 
Proof: To show that for a continuous distribution the individual's 
compensating variation statement of willingness to pay for reduced risk 
includes the unobservable utility terms, we examine self-protection that 
influences either the probability distribution or the severity (costs) of the 
health outcomes or both. 
First, maximize the expected utility index (5) by selecting an optimal 
level of self-protection s* E S yielding the following first-order condition 
for an interior solution 
b 
EU : -E 1 u c 1 + j u ch F dh. 
w ws a·.-.; S 
I 6 l 
The left-hand side of (6) represents the marginal cost of increased 
self-protection in terms of the utility of foregone wealth. The right-hand 
side reflects two types of marginal self-protection benefits: the :irst term 
is the direct utility effect of enhanced wealth resulting from reduced 
expected ex post costs; the second term is the indirect utility effect of a 
stochastically dominating change in the distribution of health outcomes. 
The indirect effect was derived by integrating by parts the effect of 
self-protection on the distribution 
r 
' 




I b ,1:1 
UF I + I 
s a 
U ChF dh, 
w s 
U ChF dh 
w s 
~ (b;•) = 0. Assume that improved health outcomes will 
decrease the ex post costs, ~ < 0. 
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Solve for the compensating variation statement of the willing~ess to pay 
for reduced risk by totally differentiating the expected utility index (5), 
and then applying the first-order condition (6). When self-protection 
influences both the probability and severity of health outcomes such that ~ < 
0 and S < 0, the willingness to pay expression is 
dW 
dr 
r-· f ~ChF rdh -
L
l r u c F dh -
w h 5 
r u c dFi f; C r dF .li 
ws _j 
> o, 
where all integrals are evaluated over the support [a, b]. Obviously, the 
unobservable utility indexes cannot be removed from the individual's 
willingness to pay expression (7). 
Even the assumption of a simple two-state world fails to remove the 
utility terms from (71. For example, let rr(s, r) and (1- rr(s, r)) 
respectively represent the subjective probabilities of healthy and of sick 
states. Let U0 (W- s) and u1 (W- s- C(s, r)) be the expected ~tili~y of 
being healthy or sick, where u0 > u1 • The individual thus chooses s E s to 
maximize 
EU = rr(s, r1u0 (W - s1 + (1 - rr(s, rl IU1 (W- s - C(s, rl 1. 
Following the same steps as before, the willingness to pay expression is 
dw 
dr 
where rrr < 0 I rrs > 0 I u l = au 1 I aw I and u 0 = auo I aw. 
> 0, 
Again, utility terms 
cannot be removed irrespective of state independence or dependence. 
(71 
I 3 I 
(9 I 
Next allow, as do Gerking and Stanley [11], self-protection to influence 
the severity, S < 0, but not the probability, ~ = 0, of health outcomes. 
Fur~her assume that ~ = 0, which, with ~ = 0, implies that neither 
13 
collective nor individual actions will influence the probability o: a 
par~icular health outcome; i.e., hazard concentrations resemble sunspots or 
the phases of the moon. With these assumptions, expression (7) reduces to 
dW 
dr 
E[U C I 
w r 
E[U C I 
w s 
EU EC - cov(U , 
w r w 
EU EC - cov(U , 






> 0. 1 10 1 
For the unobservable utility terms to be absent from (10), the two covariance 
expressions must be zero; however, our model assumptions do not allow them to 
be zero. Therefore the two utility terms cannot be removed. 
Finally, assume, as does Rosen (30] 1 that self-protection affects 
probability 1 F5 < 0, but not severity 1 C5 = 0. In Rosen's [30] terms, one 
cannot be more severely dead. For similar reasons, q = 0. Under these 
conditions, expression (7) reduces to 
dW 
dr 
J U ChF dh 
w r 
juc F dh' 
w h s 
and again the willingness to pay expression cannot be rid of the unobservable 
utility terms, which concludes the proof. 
We could examine additional cases. For example, self-protection might 
influence only the probability of a health outcome, but hazard concentrations 
could affect probability and severity, or vice versa. The results would not 
change: utility terms would loom up in the willingness to pay expressions, 
implying empirical efforts that use observed behavior data, and that policy 
efforts to aggregate across individuals and to account simultaneously for the 
reality of probability and severity unavoidably involve interpersonal utility 
comparisons.6J 
14 
Given the assumptions of the model and our above development of 
sufficien~ sonditions under which Proposition 1 would not hold can be stated 
,, 
as a corollary.-
Corollary 1: Utility terms will not appear in ex ante willingness to 
pay expressions for endogenous risk changes if and only if at least one 
of the following conditions is true: 
a) A two-state world exists where ex ante self-protection affects 
only ex ante probability; 
b) A two-state world exists where ex ante self-protection affects 
only ex post severity, and the marginal utilities between states 
are equal; 
c) States are discrete, ex post severity is independen~ of ex 
ante self-protection, and a unique self-protection activity exists 
that exerts no cross-partial effects across states. 
Corollary la clearly fits some stark life and death situations. In addition, 
self-protection can reduce the probability of diseases like cancer without 
changing its severity. Substantial imagination is required to think of real 
situations corresponding to lb. Corollary lc might apply where there are 
multiple forms of a disease like cancer. It requires that actions taken to 
avoid skin cancer, for example, do not change the probability of lung cancer. 
4.2 Nonconvex Dose-Response Relations. Proposition 1 poses hurdles to 
procedures which use observed behavior data or which would establish a social 
risk-benefit test by summing unweighted compensating or equivalent variations 
across individuals.~ Yet another problem for these procedures is the 
ambiguous effect that a change in hazard concentrations has on the sign of 
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compensating variation. 
An individual's marginal compensating variation can be shown~~ be 
ambiguous in sign even if the strongest possible case for negative effec~s of 
increased hazard exposure is imposed. To illustrate, define strong convexity 
as follows. Definition 1: Strong convexity of risk is defined as: convex ex 
post cost, err > 0; convexity of the distribution function, Frr > 0; and 
declining marginal productivity of self-protection, Sr > 0, ~r > 0, q 11 > 0 
and F > 0. 
'' 
Strong convexity describes the conditions most favorable for ~he 
traditional argument that increased risk requires progressively increasing 
compensation to maintain a constant level of expected utility. Increased 
exposure increases the probability and the expected ex poSt costs of 
undesirable health outcomes to the hazard at an increasing rate; moreover, ~he 
marginal productivity of self-protection is decreasing across the beard. 
The opposite case is strong nonconvexity. Strong nonconvexity defines 
the weakest case for negative effects of increased exposure to the hazard. 
Definition 2: Strong nonconvexity of risk is defined as: nonconvex ex post 
cost, err < 0; concavity of the distribution function, Frr < 0; and increasing 
marginal productivity of self-protection, Sr < o, ~r < o, sh < o and 
F < 0.~ 
'' 
The following proposition states the result: 
Proposition 2: Even in the absence of cognitive illusions or :ailure to 
consider all scarcity dimensions of the risk-taking problem, a 
maintained hypothesis of strong convexity of risk is insufficient 
to guarantee that increased exposure to a hazard requires 
progressively increasing compensation to maintain a constant level 
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of expected utility. Similarly, strong ~onconvexity is 
insufficient to guarantee progressively decreasing compensation. 
The proposition is supported by Dehez and Dr~ze [8, p. 98], who show 
that the sign of the marginal willingness to pay for safety given an increase 
in the probability of death is generally ambiguous. Dreze [9, p. 172] 
concludes that any assertions about this sign given a change in safety 
'' ... must be carefully justified in terms of underlying assumptions." 
Proposition 2 contradicts the argument of Weinstein et al. (44] and 
others that individuals at greater risk must have a greater demand for safety. 
Consequently, contrary to Rosen (30], individuals at greater risk with greater 
wealth cannot necessarily be weighted more heavily when risk reductions are 
valued. Similarly, the assertions by Kahneman and Tversky (17] and Smith and 
Desvousges [35] that increasing marginal willingness to pay for reduced risk 
[I'! 
constitutes a lapse from rational economic behavior are not supported.-
Proof: To demonstrate that an increase in hazard concentration has an 
ambiguous effect on an individual's compensating variation, differentiate the 




~ r,: ( U c2 - u c I - 2 ) [ u c c - u c IF dh + 
a 1- ww r w rr ww r h w hr r J U C F dhl w h rr 
+ r;(U c c - U C I + L ww s r w sr r u c - u chc 1 F dh • ·w hr w-w r s 
+ ( U C C - U C ] F dh + - J U ChF dhl , 
ww s r w sr r '"' sr _j 
il = ) U C F dh -
w h s 
) U C dF > 0, 
w s 
.:). = J U ChF dh - J U C dF < 0, 
w r w r 
and all integrals are evaluated over the support [a, b]. 
The terms on the right-hand side of (12) can be defined in terms of 
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I 12) 
direc~ and indirec~ utility effects given an increase in exposure t~ a hazard. 
n > 0 and ~ < 0 represent the combined first-order direct and indirect utilitj 
effects of s and r. The first and fourth terms in (12) represent second-order 
direct utility effects on expected costs with an increase in exposure. Given 
strong convexity, the sign of the first term is negative. The sign of the 
fourth term is ambiguous in the sense that alternative parameterizations are 
conceivable in which either Uw\vcs Cr or Uw Csr dominates in absolute magnitude. 
The second, fifth, and sixth terms are second-order direct and indirect 
utility effects weighted by the marginal effect on the distribution o~ ei~her 
s or r. Given strong convexity, the signs of all three terms are ambiguous in 
the above sense. Without prior information on the magnitude of the marginal 
effects on the expected cost function, there is no reason to expect one term 
to dominate. The third and seventh terms represent the second-order indirect 
and cross-indirect utility effects of increased exposure. By the definition 
of strong convexity, the sign on both terms is negative. Without know·ing the 
relative magnitude of all the direct and indirect utility effects, however, 
strong convexity is insufficient to sign (12) unambiguously. Likew~se, the 
assumption of strong nonconvexity is also insufficient to sign (12). Whether 
one imposes strong convexity or strong nonconvexity the sign of (12) ~s 
ambiguous. Although numerous sufficient conditions for increasing or 
decreasing marginal willingness to pay can be determined, there is, in the 
absence of prior information or simple ad hoc assumptions, no reason to expect 
that one or two terms will dominate expression {12). This concludes the 
proof. Intuitively, the results occur because a changed exposure that induces 
self-protection may have productivity effects on probability that differ from 
those on severity. The only clear-cut sufficient condition for signing (12) 
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is the absence of all severity effects. This is stated as Corollary 2. 
Cor~llary 2: Assuming no severity effects (S = S = 0), then the 
assumption of strong convexity is sufficient to guarantee increasing 
marginal ex ante valuations with increasing exposures. 
Again, diseases like cancer or events like death seem the only apt examples 
that clearly fit the corollary. 
4.3 Self-Protection Exoenditures as a Lower 3ound. Consideration ~f sel:-
protection has not been limited to problems of ex ante valuation under 
uncertainty. A substantial literature has emerged, e.g., Courant and Porter 
[4] and Harrington and Portney [12], which demonstrates that under perfect 
certainty the marginal benefit of a reduction in a health threat is equal to 
the savings in self-protection expenditures necessary to maintain the lnitial 
health state. This result cannot be extended to the uncertainty case when 
self-protection influences both ex ante probability and ex post severity. 
Proposition 3: Neither strong convexity nor strong nonconvexity of risk is 
sufficient to sign the effect of a risk change upon self-protection 
expenditures. Therefore these expenditures" cannot be used to determine 
the welfare effect of a risk change. 
Proposition 3 contradicts Berger et al. 's [2] argument that i: increased 
exposure increases the marginal productivity of self-protection, F < 0, then ,, 
self-protection will increase with exposure. Consequently, Berger et al. 's 
[2, p. 975] sufficient conditions for ''plausible'' results do not hold when 
self-protection influences both probability and severity. 
Proof: To demonstrate that strong convexity is insufficient to 
determine the effect increased hazard exposure has on self-protection, take 
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the firs~-order condition in equation (6) and apply the implicit :u~c~icn 
theorem. T~e effect of increased exposure on self-protection ~s 
dr 
-iE[U C 11 + C I - U C ] + 
L- ww r s w rs 
[ u c - U c I 1 ..- c I IF dh 
w sh ww h s · r 
I 13 I 
+ f [ U c - u c ch] F dh + f U ChF dh '1 /D 
w hr ww r s w sr 
where 
D E[U c 11 + c 1 - u c J • 2f rue 
·...rw s s w ss w 'sh - U C C JF dh '1,-.l'W h S 5 
I 14 I 
f U C F dh + f U C F dh < 0 
ww h s w h 55 
and all integrals are evaluated over the support [a, b]. D is the second-
order sufficient condition of the maximization problem (5), and is assumed to 
hold whenever (61 holds. 
Given 0 < 0, the sign of (13) depends on the sign of its right-hand-side 
numerator. The first term in the numerator of {13) is the direct utili~y 
effect of increased exposure on expected costs. Given strong convexity of 
risk and (1 + Sl > 0 from the first-order condition, the sign of the first 
term is negative. The second term reflects the indirect utility effect of 
increased exposure on the distribution. Given strong convexity, its sign is 
ambiguous in the earlier defined parameterization sense. The third term is a 
direct utility effect weighted by the marginal effect of self-pr~tec~icn on 
the distribution (~ < 0), and its sign is also ambiguous. The signs for the 
second and third effect are ambiguous since there is no a priori reason to 
believe that any one set of terms dominates the others. The fourth term in 
the numerator is the cross-indirect utility effect of increased exposure. 
Given strong convexity, its sign is nega~ive. Therefore, without prior 
information on the relative magnitudes of ~he four direct and indirec~ utility 
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effects, st=?ng convexity is insufficient to sign (13) unambiguously. 
the conditi8ns most favorable to the traditional argument that increased risk 
will increase self-protection, we still require prior information on the 
impact that increased exposure has on the marginal productivity of self-
protection to support the argument. 
Following the logic above, an assumption of strong nonconvexity of rLsk 
leads to a similar conclusion of an ambiguous effect of increased exposure en 
self-protection. Consequently, since self-protection may decrease as exposure 
to a hazard increases, self-protection expenditures cannot be considered a 
consistent lower bound on the ex ante value a risk averse individual at~aches 
to a reduction in risk. This concludes the proof. The only clear-c~t cases 
in which these expenditures would be a lower bound can be stated as a 
corollary. 
Corollary 3: Sufficient conditions for self-protection expendit~res 
being a lower bound on the ex ante value of risk reductions include: 
a) Csr < 0, which is true under strong nonconvexity, and F,; F = 0. 
' 
b) Fsr > 0, which is true under strong convexity, and Cs = c, = 0. 
Examples of Corollary 3a are not obvious; cancer and death provide the best 
examples for Corollary 3b. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Individuals and policymakers use self-protection activities tc influence 
both their ex ante risks and their expected ex post consequences. Given, as 
we have argued, that both forms of self-protection jointly occur in practice 
with great frequency, the implications of this for efforts to value risks to 
human health and property are unequivocally negative. Only the corollaries 
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provide a ra~her pinched basis for optimism about the efficiency 
traditional risk valuation efforts. With a parsimonious model in which only 
wealth provides direct utility, we show that unobservable utility ~erms cannot 
be eliminated from marginal willingness to pay expressions, implying that 
empirical efforts which identify marginal rates of substitution with 
willingness to pay are misdirected. We also show that even under the most 
favorable restrictions increased risk need not imply progressively increasing 
levels of compensation in order to restore initial utility levels. 
Consequently the traditional argument that those who are exposed to greater 
risk and have greater wealth must value a given risk reduction more highly 
does not follow. Finally, we demonstrate that increased risk need not imply 
increased self-protection expenditures; thus, changes in these expendi~ures 
may not bound the value of a risk change. 
Some succor for risk valuation efforts could be obtained by stepping 
outside professional boundaries to draw upon prior information from 
psychology, biomedicine, and other disciplines. Insight might therefore be 
gained into the signs and the relative magnitudes of many terms in expressions 
(12) and (13). It is odd that the field of economics, which explicitly 
recognizes the policy relevance of incomplete markets, has historically been 
reluctant to use information from other disciplines in order to simulate. the 
valuation results of a complete market. We recognize that there is a growing 
trend to incorporate restrictions about structure, functional forms, and 
parameter values from other disciplines into the behavioral pos~ulates of 
economic models.U! The results of this paper suggest that the incorporation 
process should be accelerated. With nonexperimental data, the Bayesian 
diagnostic techniques of Leamer [20] could be used to establish systematically 
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the restrictions ~o which estimates of (12) and (13) are especial~y sensitive. 
Controlled experiments could be used for the same purpose. We report 
elsewhere (Shogren and Crocker [33}) results of controlled experiments showing 
empirically that self-protection increases the willingness to pay for risk 
reduction, where, by definition, the reductions are collectively and self-
supplied. Although this result conforms neatly to the Le Chatelier principle 
as well as to Spencer and Zeckhauser [37], similar empirical rather than 
purely theoretical analyses are likely to be required if the complexities 
offered by the three propositions in this paper are to be overcome. 
Incorporation and more empirical analysis will not overcome, however, 
the aggregation problems posed by the presence of utility terms in 
individuals' willingness to pay expressions. Approaches to aggrega=e risk-
benefit analysis do exist other than the mechanical summation of consumer 
surpluses calculated from the singular value judgement that social welfare and 
aggregate total income are synonymous. Given that individual consumer 
surpluses can be estimated, one possibility is to draw upon the extensive 
equivalence scale literature, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer (7], in order to 
weight each individual or household. Tradeoffs can then be evaluated using an 
explicit social welfare function which recognizes that personal health is in 
part self-produced and inalienable. Alternatively, utilities might be 
calculated directly. 
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List of Svmbols 
0 is zero. 
is equal to. 
is an integral sign. 
" 
is greater than or equal 
,; is less than or equal 
c is script Epsilon. 
co is infinity. 
~is not equal to. 
> is greater than. 
< is less than. 
n is Omega. 
U is print Delta. 





1. The ability of our individuals to take intervening actions implies thac 
we are •..;orking within the "temporal risk" context of Spence and 
Zeckhauser [37]. Because we directly incorporate these intervening 
actions into our model, we do not violate the independence axiom of 
expected utility theory. 
2. For example, the moral hazard literature deals with the effect of 
insurance on an individual's incentives to self-protect, the bidding 
literature recognizes that the probability of winning depends upon the 
bid submitted, and the resource depletion literature accounts :or the 
effect that the amount extracted has upon knowledge of additi8nal 
reserves. 
3. The folk truth that ''you can lead a horse to water but you can't make it 
drink'' seems appropriate. 
4. The [a, b] interval could also be influenced in subsequent periods by 
self-protection. We disregard this issue. 
5. The distribution G(h) first-order stochastically dominates the 
distribution F(h) when G(h) s F{h) for all h e[a,b], which is equivalent 
to obtaining G(h) from F(h) by shifting the probability mass to the 
right. 
6. Assumptions of a risk-neutral individual with an identity map of ex post 
costs would eliminate the unobservable utility terms. These assumptions 
seem excessively restrictive. , Alternatively, one might eliminate the 
utility terms by using the pointwise optimization technique that 
Mirr lees ( 23] and Holmstrom ( 14]- employ. However, pointwise 
optimization evaluates self-protecting choices individually at each and 
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every heal~h state rather than in terms of lotteries over he~lth s~a~es. 
I~ ~hus adopts an ex post rather than an ex ante perspective. 
7. Proofs of this and of subsequent corollaries are available from the 
authors upon request. 
8. See Polemarchakis, et al. (27] for recent thinking on aggrega~~~n under 
exogenous risk. 
9. Rogerson [29] assumes that the distribution function must generally 
satisfy the convexity of the distribution function condition {CDfC). 
Therefore, the assumption of a concavP. distrib~tion in r and s ~s 
perhaps restrictive. As shown by Jewitt [15], however, the CDFC 
assumption is not universally required in that it satisfies very few o: 
the standard distributions set forth in statistics textbooks. 
10. Close inspection of the Smith and Desvousges [35, pp. 110-111] 
questionnaire reveals that respondent opportunities to influe~ce =he 
chance of death and the time to death were not fully controlled. Given 
the enhanced adjustment opportunities that self-protection provides, the 
exogenous risk valuations that Smith and Desvousges [35] presume chey 
are reporting would be underestimates of risk reduction values and 
overestimates of risk increase values. Effects on changes in marainal 
willingness-~o-pay depend upon the manner in which the marginal 
productivity of self-protection varies with risk. 
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